



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1952.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

At the suggestion of McGeorge Bundy on the occasion of his visit to Washington last week, I am sending you herewith for your information the latest draft of the Department's position paper for the forthcoming UN General Assembly, on the subject of "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments; Report of the Disarmament Commission."

This paper is still subject to final clearance.

Very sincerely yours,

Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Enclosure:

One copy of DAC D-10a.

State Dept. review completed

Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
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DAC D-10a

September 18, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Position Paper for the Seventh Regular Session
of the General Assembly

Subject: Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All
Armed Forces and All Armaments; Report of the Disarma-
ment Commission

The attached document incorporates the suggestions made by the members of DAC at the meeting held on September 16, 1952. It is distributed for final clearance at the earliest possible date. Comments should be addressed to Howard Meyers, UNP, Room 6104 New State Building.

E. H. Christensen
Secretary

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POSITION PAPER
Seventh Regular Session
of the General Assembly

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES
AND ALL ARMAMENTS: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

THE PROBLEM

What course of action should be taken by the United States in the General Assembly on the subject of disarmament and, in particular:

- a. To bring to the attention of the General Assembly and world opinion the seriousness of United States efforts to achieve an effective and comprehensive disarmament program;
- b. To counter expected Soviet attacks on the disarmament proposals made in the Disarmament Commission by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and to counter probable Soviet disarmament proposals.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In the opening address in the General Debate, the head of the United States Delegation should:
 - a. Reaffirm the determination of the United States to achieve international peace and world security, and recognize United States responsibility as a Member of the United Nations to promote these objectives;
 - b. Declare that the major problem ^{relating to peace and security} in the world today is aggression, no matter how committed;
 - c. Reaffirm the solemn commitment of the United States, under the Charter of the United Nations, never to use armed force contrary to the Charter, and declare this is a commitment against the use of aggression in any form or with any weapon, whether employing

bacteriological

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bacteriological warfare, atomic weapons, mass armies or any other weapon;*

d. Emphasize that this pledge not to use armed force contrary to the Charter is supported by an affirmative program advanced by the United States, designed to do more than just eliminate all instruments of mass destruction—whether BW, bombs or mass armies—by also proposing vast reductions in armed forces and armaments of all kinds, attempting to make the possibility of war less likely through agreement on an effective comprehensive disarmament program, and describe US efforts in the Disarmament Commission as evidence of US intentions in this regard;

e. Reaffirm US intent to continue working for disarmament and peace, in the Disarmament Commission and any other feasible forum.

2. During the hearings on the Report of the Disarmament Commission, the United States should introduce in Committee a resolution which should contain the following principal points:

a. Note and approve of the work of the Disarmament Commission;

b. Indicate that the goal of disarmament is not to regulate the conduct of hostilities but to create conditions which will reduce the likelihood of aggressive warfare.

c. Reaffirm General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI), which established the Disarmament Commission, and request the Commission to continue its efforts to work out the comprehensive disarmament plans called for by that resolution.

d. Call on all

*It is suggested that this pledge would be given added force if supported by both the Republican and Democratic candidates for President in statements made after the speech is given in the G.A.

d. Call on all states to cooperate in aiding the Commission to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned.

A draft resolution is attached as Annex A.

The resolution should have wide and representative sponsorship in order to help obtain maximum support. In view of the membership of the Disarmament Commission, the sponsors might include the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, Chile or Brazil, and an Arab state.

3. In connection with the above-described resolution, the U. S. Delegation should emphasize the role played by the United States in the Disarmament Commission. The United States, individually or joined in partnership with the United Kingdom and France, has placed before the Disarmament Commission the broad outline of a possible comprehensive disarmament program. This fact, a simple explanation of the proposals, and our willingness to discuss open-mindedly any proposals in the Commission should all be emphasized.

4. The United States Delegation should counter possible Soviet disarmament proposals calling for (i) ratification of the 1925 Geneva bacteriological warfare protocol, (ii) a United Nations declaration against the use of napalm, (iii) one-third reduction of armed forces and non-atomic armaments by the Five Great Powers, (iv) a declaration for prohibition of atomic weapons now but with the understanding prohibition is to go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of international

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of international controls, and (iv) a world conference on disarmament within a few months.

a. When Soviet propaganda charges unrelated to disarmament are introduced into discussion of disarmament, particularly those alleging the United States has used bacteriological warfare in North Communist Korea or China, the Delegation should (i) point out these are the same lies uttered previously by the Communists and reminiscent of Hitler's "Big Lie" technique; (ii) remind the Assembly that the U.S. had many times requested an impartial investigation of these charges, only to have these requests rejected by the Chinese Communists, the North Korean Communists and the Soviet Union, the latter by its familiar and oft-used veto in the Security Council; (iii) raise the point of order that these charges are unrelated to disarmament, will be discussed elsewhere in the General Assembly (either in connection with a Soviet agenda item dealing specifically with these charges or expanded to include them or under an item introduced by one of the Western democracies. See position paper on Soviet Charges), and are extraneous to the immediate problem. The background paper on BW should be referred to for additional arguments.

b. As to ratification of the 1925 Geneva BW protocol, the Delegation should explain that the United States believes the protocol's objective is humane and worthy but too limited. The protocol merely collects promises not to use BW, and reservations to the treaty allow its use in retaliation, while permitting stockpiling of such weapons. The United States wishes to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, including BW, under adequate safeguards and as part of a comprehensive and balanced

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and balanced disarmament program. The UN problem cannot be dealt with in isolation but must be disposed of within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament program, and it is to that end that all should band their efforts. It is not enough merely to attempt to regulate the conduct of war, and the United States believes the true goal is to create conditions making the outbreak of war far less likely. The gravest threat against peace and security / arises in aggression, no matter what weapons are employed, and the United States is attempting to reduce the possibility and likelihood of aggression through agreement on an overall disarmament system. United States efforts in the Disarmament Commission bear testimony to the seriousness and extent of our efforts to attain this objective.

a. With regard to any declaration not to use napalm, it should be pointed out that napalm is an incendiary, one of a class of weapons used for 2,000 years and employed on both sides in World War II, familiar in antiquity as "Greek fire." In Korea, it has been used only against military objectives, particularly fortifications, bunkers and emplacements. Any declaration against its use distorts the role napalm has legitimately played in helping out-numbered UN forces successfully resist and repel a criminal act of armed aggression in Korea. Such a declaration only ignores the root of the problem, how to achieve balanced disarmament and increase the likelihood of peace, rather than merely to regulate the conduct of war. It might be said that all weapons are frightful when used for aggressive purposes, but the attempt to regulate their use without relating this to the total of disarmament problems only intensifies our difficulties.

The United States
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The United States wants to go beyond the limited approach of regulating the conduct of war, and to create conditions making war far less likely.

A declaration not to use napalm or other incendiary weapons, while subject to the same difficulties as described above for the 1925 Geneva BW protocol, has an additional defect. It represents another effort by the USSR to eliminate individual weapons--atomic, BW, napalm--while leaving untouched the problem of reducing mass armies which are increasing in size. This approach is completely one-sided. In fact, if today there was a declaration against the use of any individual weapon, and no agreement on overall disarmament, it would only cause an increase in the size of armed forces all over the world. The free world would become an armed camp, with whole peoples moved into the armed services and their economies devoted to nothing but support of these mass armies. The problem of napalm or any other individual weapon must be considered as part of a comprehensive disarmament program, in order to make any progress.

This does not mean that the U.S. is uninterested in examining the question of the rules or conduct of war, or in trying to protect the civilian population and prisoners of war in better fashion, should war unhappily occur. The U.S. believes these problems are subsidiary to the issue of disarmament, and that mixing the two issues enhances the difficulties of solving the problems in both fields. The primary goal is disarmament, and here the objective is to establish an open and substantially disarmed world which requires agreement on a comprehensive disarmament system, with attention directed to all elements and not just to a few weapons.

4. As regards the one-third reduction, atomic weapons and disarmament conference proposals, the Delegation should point out that these proposals are substantially similar to those made in previous years by the Soviet Union and rejected over and over again by the General Assembly. Furthermore, the apparent variations from previous proposals have not been explained by the USSR in the Disarmament Commission, since the Soviet Union insists that its proposals must be accepted in principle before a detailed explanation will be given of their meaning and scope. The United States would welcome these explanations.

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these explanations and is anxious to discuss the Soviet proposals in the Disarmament Commission.

CONTENT:

1. During the past six months the USSR in the Disarmament Commission, in the Security Council and at the Toronto Red Cross Conference has placed major emphasis on the propaganda theme that the United States has used bacteriological warfare in North Korea and China, a theme played with variations. The nature of these charges and Soviet bloc activities with respect to them is described in the position paper on Soviet charges ~~the Effect on International Peace and Security of the Soviet Efforts to Discredit United Nations Action in Korea~~ and the background paper specifically concerned with BW.

2. In the Disarmament Commission, the USSR has at various times extolled the virtues of its proposals on disarmament which had been referred to the Commission by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly. The Soviet proposals would have the Disarmament Commission recommend that the General Assembly proclaim immediately the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons ~~and the establishment of strict international prohibition of atomic weapons~~ and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that prohibition and the institution of control ^{were} to be put into effect simultaneously. The Assembly should also declare that it considered the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and mass destruction, to be at variance with the conscience and honor of peoples and incompatible with United Nations membership. The USSR would have the Big Five Powers reduce their armaments and armed forces by one-third within a year. An international control organ ~~ould~~ be established within the framework of the Security Council to supervise the implementation

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the implementation of atomic weapons prohibition and the one-third reduction, as well as to verify official information disclosed by states regarding their armaments and armed forces. This international control organ would have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but would not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state. A world disarmament conference should be called not later than July 15, 1952 to consider the problems involved in reducing armed forces and armaments, and how to prohibit the atomic weapon and establish international control over such prohibition. The Disarmament Commission should prepare a draft convention by June 1, submitting it to the Security Council, covering the same problems which were subsequently to be considered by the world conference. Finally, and it is point was added after the BW propaganda campaign began, the USSR demanded consideration of the questions of violating the prohibition against bacteriological warfare, the banning of the use of BW, and calling to account those who violated such ban.

In the Disarmament Commission, the queries of various members for clarification of the Soviet proposals were met by Mr. Malik's insistence that the members of the Commission must first accept the Soviet proposals in principle and then Mr. Malik would explain what he meant.

It should also be noted that, at the Toronto Red Cross conference, the USSR delegation introduced a resolution which sought an unconditional declaration that atomic weapons should be prohibited. However, the UK delegation amended the resolution to read that governments should agree, within the framework of a general disarmament program, to a plan for international control

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international control of atomic energy which would assure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. In this form, the resolution was adopted by the Conference.

3. On July 21, 1952, prominent non-Communist English intellectuals, particularly from the fields of the theater and the arts, wrote a letter to Secretary General Lie protesting the United Nations Command's use of napalm in Korea, and denouncing the use of the weapon as barbarous because it inflicted the most painful wounds of any weapon and was used indiscriminately against inhabited places with appalling results. The North Korean Communist radio on August 20, 1952 called the repeated United Nations air bombings in North Korea "barbaric" and demanded that the use of napalm be halted. This attack on napalm may be followed up in the General Assembly.

4. The history of past sessions of the General Assembly shows that the Soviet Union's proposals on a particular subject in the Assembly closely parallel their activities in other United Nations or international bodies during the recent months prior to that session of the Assembly. Consequently, the USSR can be expected to pursue a course in the Seventh General Assembly which will vary only slightly the Soviet themes described in the three previous paragraphs. The relative success of the Soviet bloc tactics at the Toronto Red Cross conference in emphasizing the 1925 Geneva protocol, as opposed to the failure at Toronto and in the United Nations to make headway with their allegations that the United States was using bacteriological warfare in Korea, indicates that the Soviets will probably concentrate on trying to obtain General Assembly approval for a resolution calling on all states which

had not

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had not adhered to or ratified the 1925 protocol to do so without delay. The resolution, or a separate resolution, may also demand cessation of the use of napalm as barbarous and incompatible with United Nations membership. This would adapt Soviet tactics to the sophisticated membership of the United Nations delegations which, although aware of the Soviet tactics and probably doubting Communist charges that the United States is employing BW, might be induced to support a resolution of the type described because many of their governments have ratified the 1925 Geneva protocol and also because of possible pressure of public opinion in their countries influenced to some degree by the Communist propaganda campaign on this subject. Together with these approaches, the USSR may be expected to criticize the United States or Western disarmament proposals introduced in the Disarmament Commission as vague and as putting off indefinitely any substantial disarmament, as opposed to the "simple" and apparently immediate disarmament of the nature called for by the Soviet disarmament proposals.

5. Any attempt to impress on this session of the General Assembly the efforts of the United States to achieve effective and comprehensive disarmament must initially take into account the Soviet charges and tactics regarding bacteriological warfare. It is suggested that one of the best means to do so is by dealing with the problem in the framework of US interest in comprehensive disarmament which includes all weapons, not merely BW or napalm, as evidenced by the careful and comprehensive proposals we have made in the Disarmament Commission. Our record in this respect is good and certainly far better than that of the Soviet Union. This general approach might be divided into two specific elements:

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specific elements:

A. We should use the General Debate to emphasize that the major problem and fear in the world today is armed aggression as defined and properly condemned by the Charter. We should reaffirm the solemn commitment of the United States under the Charter of the United Nations never to use armed forces contrary to the Charter, and declare this is a pledge by the U.S. to refrain from aggression in any form or with any weapon, whether employing BW, atomic weapons, mass armies, or any other weapon. The US should then emphasize that it is supporting this pledge by more than words. It is supporting this pledge by affirmative acts designed to eliminate all instruments of mass destruction, to reduce drastically all armed forces and all armaments, to prohibit atomic weapons under international control—all this through reaching agreement on an effective and comprehensive disarmament program to reduce the likelihood of war. In this connection a description of our efforts in the Disarmament Commission will serve as evidence of US intention. The US should then reaffirm its intent to continue working for disarmament and peace in the Disarmament Commission and in any other feasible forum.

If at all possible, the declaration that the United States pledges never to use armed force contrary to the Charter should subsequently be supported by statements made by the Republican and Democratic candidates for President. Such statements would give added force to the declaration, indicating that the next administration in the United States would fully support such a pledge. It is suggested that the two Presidential candidates be advised of the proposed pledge and asked if they would
make statements

make statements affirming their support.

It is impossible at the present for the United States to ratify the 1925 Geneva BW protocol or to declare that BW would not be used except in retaliation. The reasons are numerous, the three most important being (1) that such ratification or declaration would restrict us, since we would respect the commitment, but not the Soviet Union, which has already provided basis for employing BW through its false allegations of US use and could say that Soviet employment of such weapons was only in "retaliation," (2) because this would make it even more difficult than at present to maintain our position opposing the USSR call for an unconditional declaration prohibiting using atomic bombs, when we insist on their elimination as a result of an effective system of international control, and (3) because it is doubtful that the U. S. would gain even propaganda advantage from such a declaration but would, on the contrary, impliedly cast doubt on the validity of its previous position on BW and lose prestige by appearing to accede to the 1925 Protocol through the pressure of Soviet propaganda. Moreover, the official US position on bacteriological warfare, as expressed in the Disarmament Commission, is that the BW issue can only be solved within the general framework of a comprehensive disarmament program under effective safeguards, and not as an isolated problem. Any commitment against use except in retaliation, without safeguards, would give the illusion of safety while in fact providing no protection, and would also open the way for a USSR propaganda campaign seeking more of such commitments for other weapons, such as napalm and, of course, atomic weapons.

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weapons.

On the other hand, a declaration that the US will never use armed force contrary to the Charter, this being a commitment against armed aggression no matter what weapon might be used, is an affirmative and dramatic acknowledgment of the Charter obligation not to wage aggressive war. Such a declaration will point up the fact that armed aggression is the major problem in the world today in connection with peace and security. This follows a line familiar to the General Assembly and overwhelmingly adopted through the "Peace Through Deeds" resolution, No. 390(V), 17 November 1950. These concepts are familiar to Members of the United Nations and have been approved by them. Reaffirmation by the United States should minimize the effect of the BW use allegations, because such reaffirmation goes beyond a mere declaration against the use of a particular weapon. It should serve to focus attention on the fact that the major cause of world unrest and fear today in regard to peace and security is aggression; that the US by virtue of its culture as a democratic system cannot be the first to commit aggression. Moreover, the statement that the US is determined to work for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should help to place the BW problem in proper focus as only one of the many problems in the Disarmament Commission, and here the US can point to its record in the Disarmament Commission as evidence of its intention to continue working for disarmament and for peace.

The US has introduced in the Disarmament Commission, individually or in concert with the UK and France, the following proposals: On April 24, 1952, the "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program" stating

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the objectives and principles which should guide the Disarmament Commission; on April 5, 1952 the proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic; on May 26, 1952, the tripartite paper suggesting fixing numerical limits on armed forces; and on August 12, 1952 the tripartite supplement dealing with the relationship of armaments to permitted forces, suggesting procedures by which an agreed disarmament program might be developed, and clarifying the concept of balanced relationship between the essential components of a disarmament program. These proposals give the broad outline of a possible and comprehensive disarmament system, and provide good evidence of the seriousness with which the US is attacking all the problems in this field, not merely bacteriological warfare or the use of napalm.

B. The United States Delegation should use every opportunity, whether in the Committee meetings or in individual conversations with other delegations to counter Soviet propaganda on alleged US use of BW, US failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva protocol, and possible Soviet efforts to obtain a General Assembly declaration against the use of napalm, by employing the arguments set forth in Section 4 of the RECOMMENDATIONS and the background paper concerned with BW. These arguments emphasize our past record of trying to bring about impartial investigation of the charges and the refusal of the Chinese Communists, the North Koreans and the Soviet Union to permit such impartial investigations. The arguments also point up United States desire to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, including BW, not merely to agree

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to agree not to use such weapons except in retaliation but to produce and stockpile them. The Soviet approach would merely regulate the conduct of war, while the US believes the goal of disarmament is to create conditions making the outbreak of war far less likely. This does not mean that the U.S. is uninterested in examining the question of the rules or conduct of war, or in trying to protect the civilian population and prisoners of war in better fashion, should war unhappily occur. The U.S. believes these problems are subsidiary to the issue of disarmament, and that mixing the two issues enhances the difficulties of solving the problems in both fields. The primary goal is disarmament, and here the objective is to establish an open and substantially disarmed world which requires agreement on a comprehensive disarmament system, with attention directed to all elements and not just to a few weapons. Arguments of this nature should minimize much of the propaganda in the corridors and in the Committee rooms of the General Assembly.

6. With regard to the report of the Disarmament Commission, the US Delegation should use the opportunity to demonstrate that the US earnestly desires to reach agreement on an effective and comprehensive disarmament program, both to continue to hold the initiative in this important field and also to undercut Soviet propaganda alleging that the USSR is the great peace-lover and the United States the war-monger. For this purpose, it is suggested that it might be helpful for the General Assembly to go somewhat beyond merely approving the efforts of the Disarmament Commission and urging the Commission to continue its work with the cooperation of all states. The Assembly might also record approval of the concept that the goal of disarmament is not to regulate the conduct of hostilities but to create conditions which will

reduce

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reduce the likelihood of aggressive warfare. The problem is complicated by the advisability of maintaining the relatively fluid situation now prevailing in the Disarmament Commission, in which proposals have not been pushed to votes which would thereby accentuate Soviet-Western disagreement. Moreover, in addition to the negotiating strength given through avoiding a rigid position on many issues, it may be wise to avoid this rigidity in order to continue to indicate to the Soviet Union the possibility of reaching agreements with the West in the disarmament field rather than attempting to solve the conflict of interests through using armed force. With this in mind, the one possibly controversial issue under the suggested course of action is our contention that the goal of disarmament is not merely to regulate hostilities (the essence of the USSR attempt to secure banning individual weapons without safeguards), but to reduce the likelihood of aggressive warfare. This one point is sufficiently important to warrant US efforts to secure GA approval of the concept. For the rest, we should avoid if possible giving the impression the U.S. wishes the General Assembly to settle by majority vote an issue pending in the Disarmament Commission, emphasizing instead the need for Assembly guidance of a general nature.

7. During hearings on the Disarmament Commission's report, the Soviet Union can be expected to raise again a disarmament package similar to the proposals made in previous years, as described earlier in this paper. In such case, the Delegation should point out in what respects these proposals are similar to those made in past years by the USSR and rejected by the General Assembly. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the Soviet Union has, in effect, refused to explain these proposals in the Disarmament

Commission

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Commission and has insisted that the Commission must adopt the proposals in principle before a detailed explanation would be made. The Delegation should reiterate US willingness to discuss the Soviet proposals in the Disarmament Commission and the US hope that the Soviet Union would adequately explain these proposals. It should be pointed out that the General Assembly had established the Disarmament Commission precisely to discuss any detailed and complicated disarmament proposals.

The Delegation should also stress that the USSR plan of work in the Commission (DC/L/Rev 1, 27 August 1952) demonstrates that the Soviet Union continues to advocate a position which would heighten the present imbalance of power. This Soviet position is to secure a pledge not to use atomic weapons by which the West would give up a principal deterrent to Communist aggression while at the same time a one-third reduction in armed forces and non-atomic arms would maintain and actually intensify the present imbalance in those fields. These Soviet positions have been rejected over and over again by the General Assembly, which knows a pig in a poke when it sees one. The absurdity of the Soviet proposals can be seen if we should reverse their proposition and call on the USSR to abolish immediately all armed forces and non-atomic armaments, and to reduce existing stocks of atomic weapons by one-third.

8. The USSR can be expected to attack the United States for continuing to support the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy, and to insist that the United States inflexible position on this subject prevents any agreement on overall disarmament. The United States Delegation should refer to General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI), January 11, 1952, which established the Disarmament Commission, and point out that operative paragraph 3c says that, unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the

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United Nations plan should continue to serve as the basis for international control of atomic energy to assure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. This paragraph also requires the Commission to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. The point should be made that the United States Government is always willing to consider any proposals or plans for atomic energy control and, while continually reviewing the problem, has not yet found any plan which is as effective as the United Nations plan. The Delegation should point out that the Soviet Union has not presented any new proposals in the atomic energy field to the Disarmament Commission and, in fact, has refused to explain the broad and vague Soviet proposals in principle. The extraordinarily unreasonable USSR attitude in this regard should be emphasized by the Delegation.

Attachment:

Annex A.

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TAB A

Draft Resolution Concerning Disarmament

The General Assembly

Taking Note of the Report of the Disarmament Commission, and
Recommending that

(1) Under the Charter of the United Nations all states are obligated to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force except as provided in the Charter,

(2) under a genuine and effective system of universal disarmament, no state should maintain armed forces and armaments beyond those reasonably required for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfillment of their obligations to maintain peace and security and in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

(3) the goal of such a system of universal disarmament is not to regulate the conduct of hostilities but to create conditions making the outbreak of aggressive warfare improbable and releasing the world's human and economic resources for the purposes of peace,

1. Welcomes the report of the Disarmament Commission and commends the Commission for its activities.

2. Reaffirms General Assembly Resolution 502(VI) and requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work for the development by the United Nations

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Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans under international control for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

3. Calls on all states to cooperate in aiding the Disarmament Commission to reach agreement on the problems with which it is concerned.

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